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SEÇÃO INTERNACIONAL
HOW TO MEASURE GAIN-SHARING IN AN OUTSOURCING 
RELATIONSHIP: A CASE STUDY IN INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENT*
RESUMO
Este estudo tem o objetivo de analisar o pro-
blema da mensuração do gain-sharing na tercei-
rização de serviços de tecnologia da informação 
como um componente da política de remuneração 
dos serviços contratados entre duas organizações. 
A metodologia adotada compõe-se de três passos: 
(i) revisão bibliográfi ca sobre as decisões de tercei-
rização e precifi cação de serviços terceirizados no 
ambiente de tecnologia da informação; (ii) um estu-
do de caso real em que o problema da mensuração 
do gain-sharing surge no relacionamento entre duas 
grandes empresas de classe mundial que operam 
no mercado brasileiro de cartões de crédito; (iii) dis-
cussão dos achados do estudo de caso com base 
na literatura revisada. As principais contribuições 
deste trabalho são: (i) identifi cação dos principais 
problemas relacionados às decisões de terceiriza-
ção e precifi cação de serviços terceirizados; (ii) des-
crição das características e do comportamento dos 
custos no ambiente de tecnologia da informação e 
(iii) análise e discussão do método adotado pelas 
empresas estudadas para mensuração do gain-sha-
ring. A pesquisa bibliográfi ca mostrou uma lacuna 
na literatura relacionada especifi camente à mensu-
ração do gain-sharing. Os achados do estudo de 
caso indicaram que empresas de tecnologia de in-
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formação são altamente estruturadas com custos fi -
xos e que o método de divisão de ganhos adotados 
pelas empresas estudadas corresponde à econo-
mia de custos, a qual é mensurada pelas variações 
de preço e efi ciência de acordo com parâmetros 
orçamentários. Adicionalmente, observou-se que o 
método adotado contribui para proporcionar mais 
transparência e capacidade de análise no relaciona-
mento entre as empresas envolvidas.
Palavras-chave: Gain-sharing, Tecnologia da 
Informação, Terceirização, Precifi cação, Compra.
1 INTRODUCTION
The internationalization process is a contem-
porary phenomenon that has been driving compa-
nies to adopt outsourcing strategies as an alterna-
tive to get competitive advantages. In this context 
the problem of how to remunerate outsourced ser-
vices and how to share gains that were born when 
such services were run appears. The present study 
is concerned with the relationship between busi-
ness providers and business customers of informa-
tion technology (IT) services, and focuses principally 
on the measurement of cost savings in outsourced 
activities. The study approaches the problem of the 
measurement of gain-sharing as a component of re-
muneration policies for contracted services among 
companies. The main justifi cation of this research is 
the lack of empirical studies regarding gain-sharing 
measurement methodology of outsourced services 
in an information technology environment. The ob-
jective of this present study is to investigate and to 
analyze a real-life situation where the phenomenon 
of gain-sharing measurement occurs. The research 
question posed is: How to measure gain-sharing in 
an outsourcing relationship in information technolo-
gy environment?
The methodology applied to investigate the re-
search question is a case study in which the problem 
of gain-sharing emerges in the relationship between 
two large-scale international companies that ope-
rate in Brazilian credit card market. Yin (1994) has 
observed that, in general, case studies are preferred 
research strategies (i) when “how” or “why” ques-
tions are being posed, (ii) when the investigator has 
little control over events, and (iii) when the focus is 
on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-
life context. Considering the types of case studies 
designs proposed by Yin (1994) this study can be 
characterized as a holistic single case study applied 
to describe an intervention and the real-life context 
in which it occurred.
The initial sections of the study approach re-
levant issues related to outsourcing—focusing on 
the phenomenon of internationalization, outsourcing 
relationships in IT environment, issues related to 
outsourcing decisions and considerations of pricing 
in outsourcing decisions. The second part of paper 
presents the fi ndings of an empirical case study. Af-
ter considering the competitive atmosphere of credit 
card market in Brazil, this part of the paper presents 
operational aspects of the companies involved and 
the relationships between them in terms of services 
rendered and the operational fl ow of activities. The 
nature and behavior of the costs involved in out-
sourced IT activities are studied. In this context, the 
gain-sharing measurement problem is identifi ed, 
and the main contribution of the study is the critical 
analysis of the method used by the companies for 
the measurement of gain-sharing in outsourcing ac-
tivities in information technology.
2 INTERNATIONALIZATION PROCESS
Internationalization has become common 
among producer service fi rms that seek to grow 
rapidly in today’s highly competitive environment. 
There is no single explanation as to why such fi r-
ms are expanding across national boundaries. As 
technological innovation accelerates and as new 
competitors rapidly emerge, businesses are fi nding 
their market position increasingly under pressure. 
To sustain growth and profi t levels it is now often 
necessary to gain access either to new geographical 
markets (economies of scale) or to a new range of 
services (economies of scope).
According to Dunning (1989), the competitive 
advantages gained by multinational service enterpri-
ses can take may forms. These include: (i) econo-
mies of scale that allow prices to be lowered or ser-
vice quality to be raised; (ii) the spreading of risk; (iii) 
economies of scope that allow wider collections of 
related services to be offered; (iv) greater proximity 
and that gain-sharing method adopted by studied 
companies corresponds to costs savings measured 
by cost-accounting concepts of price and effi ciency 
cost variances according to budget parameters. In 
addiction, it was observed that the method adopted 
contributes to get more transparency and capability 
to analyze the business relationship by both receiver 
and provider companies.
Keywords: Gain-sharing, Information technolo-
gy, Outsourcing, Pricing, Procurement.
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to potential customers; (v) increased local knowled-
ge; and (vi) improved corporate identity.
Coe (1997) has noted that the computer ser-
vices industry is now exhibiting strong trends in in-
ternationalization and diversifi cation. This is one of 
the fastest-growing and strategically most important 
service sectors in advanced economies. According 
to Gentle and Howells (1994), the internationalization 
process in this industry has occurred as a result of the 
increasing globalization of both demand and supply 
in the industry. On the demand side, as key multina-
tional customers have themselves internationalized, 
these customers have found dealing with different 
computer service companies in various countries to 
be unsatisfactory. As a result, major computer ser-
vice companies have responded by providing com-
prehensive and consistent services in key cities lo-
cated across a range of major industrial economies. 
On the supply side, Gentle and Howells (1994) have 
noted that competition in computer services is ap-
pearing from a number of new sources globally.
3 IT OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIP
Baldwin et al. (2001) has observed that since 
the early 1990s, there has been a signifi cant increa-
se in the number of organizations that have decided 
to outsource all or some aspects o their IT/IS func-
tions. Outsourcing information system has been the 
focus of many studies. The trend among organiza-
tions to outsource part or all of their information sys-
tem has been well documented (SOLIMAN, 2003).
According to Auguste et al. (2000), quoting 
data from Dun & Bradstreet, third-party providers 
of routine operational services—such as the pro-
cessing of payrolls, the movement of inventory and 
goods, the management of data centers, and the 
provision of extra manufacturing capacity—took in 
more than US$1 trillion around the world in 2000. 
Terdiman (1993) has noted that, according to the 
Gartner Group, the IT worldwide outsourcing market 
is estimated to rise from US$21.3 billion in 1997 to 
US$59.6 billion by 2005, with an annual growth rate 
of 14%. According to Loh and Venkatraman (1992) 
IT outsourcing—which is defi ned as the process of 
turning over part or all an organization’s IT function 
to external service provider(s)—is done to acquire 
economic, technological, and strategic advantages. 
Accordingly, increasing attention has been paid to 
building a successful partnership between the cus-
tomer and the provider of IT outsourcing services.
Anderson and Narus (1990, p. 42-58) have defi -
ned partnership as “the extent to which there is mu-
tual recognition and understanding that success of 
each fi rm is in part dependent upon the other fi rm”. 
Mohr and Spekman (1994, p. 135-152) have defi ned 
it as “purposive strategic relationship between in-
dependent fi rms who share compatible goals, strive 
for mutual benefi ts, and acknowledge a high level 
of mutual interdependency”. Narula and Hagedoorn 
(1999, p. 284) suggest that most cooperative agree-
ments have two possible motivations: “First, there 
is a cost-economizing motivation, whereby at least 
one fi rm within the relationship has entered the rela-
tionship to minimize its net costs, or in other words, 
it is cost-economizing. Second, fi rms may have a 
strategic motivation. Such agreements are aimed at 
long term profi t optimizing objectives by attempting 
to enhance the value of the fi rm`s assets”.
According to Lee (2001), IT outsourcing is one 
of the major issues facing organizations in today’s 
rapidly changing business environment. This author 
observes that, in the 1990s, many organizations 
experienced diffi culties in forming and managing 
a successful outsourcing relationship with service 
providers as the nature of outsourcing evolved from 
a contract relationship between the service recei-
ver and provider to a partnership relationship. To 
overcome this problem, several fi rms established 
intimate relationships with their service providers 
on a partnership basis—which can be defi ned as an 
inter-organizational relationship to achieve shared 
goals of the participants.
The results of Lee’s (2001) study indicate that 
partnership quality is an important variable for out-
sourcing success. The strong relationship between 
partnership quality and outsourcing success indica-
tes that fostering a cooperative relationship based 
on trust, business understanding, the sharing of ben-
efi ts and risks, confl ict resolution, and mutual com-
mitment is critical to maximize the strategic, econo-
mic, and technological benefi ts of outsourcing.
4 THE OUTSOURCING DECISION
Soliman (2003) has mentioned that several 
studies have addressed the factors infl uencing out-
sourcing decisions. Jennings (1996) has observed 
that outsourcing decisions are often emotive in that 
they challenge traditional beliefs of how the organi-
zation operates. According to Ciotti and Pagnotta 
(2005), the worst reason for outsourcing is the desire 
to abdicate responsibility for a diffi cult and challen-
ging area. Outsourcing requires rejection of the ‘we 
can do it all’ mentality. It also requires confi dence 
that loss of ownership will not result in a reduction 
in control of activities and the weakening of core 
abilities. Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) suggest that 
the outsourcing decision may be a result of rational 
consideration and it may be a product of organiza-
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tional policies, confl icts and compromises. King and 
Malhotra (2000) have mentioned that cost savings 
have often been cited as the main reason for out-
sourcing information system. Another driving force 
is management´s perception that, by surrending 
control of its information technology to an external 
supplier, it can focus better on its core business.
Quinn and Hilmer (1994) emphasized that fo-
cusing on core competencies is a major reason 
behind strategic outsourcing decisions. Humphreys 
et al. (2000) have proposed a model for ‘make or 
buy’ decisions. The fi rst step of the decision mo-
del is defi ning the core activities of the business. 
It is important to defi ne what is meant by a ‘core 
activity’. A core activity is central to the company’s 
successful servicing of the needs of potential custo-
mers in each market. The activity is perceived by the 
customers as adding value, and is therefore a major 
determinant of competitive advantage. According to 
these authors these core activities should be deve-
loped in-house. In contrast, the activities for which 
the company has neither a critical strategic need nor 
special capabilities should be outsourced.
Nellore and Soderquist (2000) have observed 
that outsourcing is the consequence of the adoption 
of a resource-based strategy in which fi rms concen-
trate on their set of core competencies through which 
they can provide distinctive value for the customers, 
while outsourcing the rest of their activities. These au-
thors have noted that the model of Quinn and Hilmer 
(1994) suggests that activities with a high potential for 
competitive edge and a high degree of strategic vulne-
rability should be realized in-house. A careful assess-
ment of a fi rm’s assets and resources must precede 
any outsourcing decision to ensure that outsourced 
activities are restricted to: (i) those in which the fi rm 
does not have any special capabilities; or (ii) those for 
which the fi rm does not have a strategic need.
The reviewed literature points out that col-
laboration have positive effects and negative effects. 
The benefi ts include:
• spreading and sharing the costs and risks 
of product development (and of business in 
general);
• reducing costs by using the imperative for 
cost reduction as a driver for product inno-
vation (noting that the supplier’s cost base 
is generally lower than that of the custo-
mers);
• accessing to technological expertise (core 
capabilities) and exploitation of technologi-
cal synergies.
The risks and negative aspects include:
• domination of one party, incompatibility in 
culture and management, or opportunistic 
behavior of either party;
• the fact that instability in most alliances 
is directly related to the trust between 
the collaborating parties, and recognition 
that trust is subjective and cannot be mea-
sured;
• the possibility of high transaction costs as-
sociated with the time and effort needed to 
manage these collaborations.
5 PRICING IN OUTSOURCING 
RELATIONSHIPS
The three basic forms of procurement contracts 
are: (i) cost-plus; (ii) fi xed-price; and (iii) gain-sharing. 
Price structures infl uence not only the incentives 
for both parties but also their interaction costs and 
the provider’s future negotiating position. Loeb and 
Surysekar (1998), mention that a cost-plus-fi xed-fee 
contract specifi es that the purchaser reimburse the 
supplier for the actual costs of executing the con-
tract plus a fi xed fee. Bajari and Tadelis (1999) say 
that in the fi xed-price contracts, the buyer offers the 
seller a pre-specifi ed fi xed price for each type of 
service. According to Auguste et al. (2000), in gain-
sharing contracts, the parties agree on the baseline 
cost of providing a service. If the cost turns out to 
have been underestimated, the provider receives 
the difference. If the actual costs are lower than the 
baseline, the difference is split between the two par-
ties in an agreed ratio.
Auguste et al. (2000) affi rm the two most com-
mon pricing choices—cost-plus and gain-sharing—
have destroyed value more often than they have cre-
ated it. With cost-plus contracts, providers lack any 
incentive to reduce costs. Customers sometimes 
believe that such contracts will save them money 
by capping the provider’s margins. But cost-plus 
contracts also limit the incentive of the provider to 
squeeze costs, because such contracts guarantee 
the provider a profi t margin that no longer depends 
on the effi ciencies it can realize by innovating, by 
exercising its purchasing power, or by hiring more 
productive staff. A gain-sharing contract better mo-
tivates the provider to innovate and to reduce opera-
ting costs. However, it also raises interaction costs. 
This is the most expensive kind of contract to nego-
tiate and monitor because the parties have to defi ne 
and accept precise cost projections for every situa-
tion. If the savings are lower than expected, further 
negotiations, in which each party blames the other, 
are almost inevitable. The incentives to innovate are 
also limited.
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Auguste et al. (2000) have suggested that fi xed-
price contracts are a better option. When prices are 
fi xed, providers keep the rewards from process in-
novation. This kind of contract is also less costly 
to negotiate and does not require customers to be 
continually auditing their provider expenses (as they 
are required to do under costs-plus and gain-sha-
ring contracts). On the other hand, these authors 
have observed that the pricing model to be applied 
must consider each specifi c situation and, although 
providers should try to negotiate fi xed-price con-
tracts for their services, they must recognize that in 
all likelihood they will have to adopt different pricing 
schemes for different services. The choice of pricing 
scheme will depend on the receptiveness of the cus-
tomer and the underlying economics of the offering.
6 CASE STUDY
The present study approached the problem of 
the measurement of gain-sharing as one of the com-
ponents of the remuneration policies for services 
adopted contractually among companies. The case 
study that follows focused on the relationship betwe-
en two large international companies that operate in 
Brazil. For reasons of confi dentiality, the companies 
are referred to as ‘services receiver’ (SR) and ‘ser-
vices provider’ (SP). SR operates in the credit card 
market, and administers a wide network of affi liated 
establishments while centralizing all completed card 
transaction operations under its brand name in Brazil. 
To accomplish this, SR depends on the technologi-
cal and operational support of SP, a company that 
renders IT services for large-scale companies and 
governments throughout the world. The services that 
SP provides for SR involve capturing, processing, 
and transmission of data, and the execution of call-
center functions for the affi liated establishments.
The pricing policy in the outsourcing rela-
tionship between SP and SR is based on the cost-
plus model, with the total cost of services rendered 
monthly by SP being charged to SR with additional 
fi xed remuneration. The differential aspect of the 
relationship between these companies is the fact 
that, apart from the cost-plus-fi xed-fee remunera-
tion, there is a special contractual agreement related 
to gain-sharing. According these agreements the 
gain-sharing computed yearly must be shared be-
tween the companies equally. This is the main issue 
analyzed in the case study.
6.1 Environment and Companies
The global process of change is having signi-
fi cant effects on the Brazilian economy. The main 
characteristics of the Brazilian economy in recent 
years have been: (i) low economic growth; (ii) gradual 
opening of the economy; (iii) privatization; (iv) relati-
ve stability of prices; and (v) technological advances. 
These characteristics have been especially marked 
in the telecommunication and fi nancial industries, 
which are passing through signifi cant market and 
structural transformation. Under the supervision of 
the Central Bank of Brazil, the fi nancial system gra-
dually implemented a new Brazilian system of pay-
ments—through which diverse fi nancial institutions 
became interlinked and carried out transactions 
on-line in real time among themselves, the Central 
Bank, and other large-scale companies.
The credit card market is globally under con-
trol of few large brand names—American Express, 
Credicard, Diners, MasterCard, and Visa. Usually, 
the rights of exploration of these brand names (also 
known as ‘fl ags’) belong to specifi c investor groups. 
These authorize the use of the brand names in va-
rious countries, utilizing contracts that involve stock 
participation in a new enterprise, and thus produ-
cing an attractive worldwide business.
The service receiver in this case study (SR) is 
the holder of the exclusive right of use in Brazil of one 
of the prominent ‘fl ags’ of credit cards. Its stock con-
trol belongs to a group of large fi nancial institutions 
that also operate in the country, apart from the par-
ticipation of the ‘fl ag’s’ own international brand. SR 
has a large number of affi liated establishments and 
users of this brand of credit card in the commercial 
service sector. Through the credit card, the user can 
make purchases in one payment, or parceled out in 
various payments, from an international net work of 
affi liated establishments to the brand. The user can 
also use the card to pay for purchases directly by de-
bit in the user’s deposit account of the fi nancial ins-
titution with which the user maintains a relationship. 
The user can also make cash withdrawals in other 
countries. The ready acceptance of credit cards is 
drastically modifying the profi le of transactions made 
in Brazilian retail trade, and has signifi cantly increa-
sed the volume of transactions made by operators.
SR opted to outsource some its activities be-
cause of: (i) operational diffi culties associated with 
the growth in transaction volume; (ii) a need to main-
tain a focus on its main business; and (iii) the chal-
lenge to develop new competencies (for example, in 
information technology). SR relies on the support of 
SP to accomplish activities that require a high level 
of information technology—especially those that, al-
though they are not core to SR’s business, are es-
sential to its success in this changing environment.
The service provider in this case study (SP) is 
a large company with branches in several countries. 
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The company is a provider of information-technolo-
gy services, and administers complex data and voice 
communication networks. SP has absorbed all of the 
IT activities related to SR’s transactions in Brazil—in-
cluding the capture, processing, and transmission of 
all data. These activities involve direct communica-
tion with: (i) affi liated establishments (merchants) to 
the brand name in Brazil; (ii) the receiver banks (whe-
re the merchants maintain their checking accounts); 
and (iii) the national and international issuing banks. 
Figure 1 represents the arrangement.
The transaction data are captured by SP by 
electronic or manual means. Approximately 95% of 
transactions are electronic. The data are captured 
by the affi liated establishments and immediately 
sent to an exchange headquarters at which a deci-
sion is made on whether the transaction should be 
authorized. If authorized, the data of the transaction 
are stored, processed, and transmitted by SP to 
the receiver bank (where the merchant maintains its 
deposit accounts) and to the issuing bank (where 
the card user maintains its accounts). Credits and 
collections are realized, and this results in an accom-
plished transaction.
In this process, speed, security and low cost 
are critical factors that determine the success of the 
business. The decision of SR to outsource these IT 
activities takes into account these factors of pro-
cess, speed, security and low cost, as well as the 
need for SR to maintain focus on its main business 
by delegating activities that require highly speciali-
zed know-how.
The services rendered by SP for SR encompass 
the following activities: (i) development and mainte-
nance of systems; (ii) maintenance of database of 
the clients; (iii) capturing, processing, and transmis-
sion of transaction data; (iv) call center service; (v) 
operational support to the affi liated establishments; 
and (vi) back-offi ce services. These activities are 
managed through a “joint team” formed by SP and 
SR managers working together, avoiding what Lim 
(2000, p. 521) refers as “informational asymmetry”.
6.2 Costs in Outsourced Activities
The costs incurred in the outsourced activities 
are: (i) administrative; (ii) telecommunications; (iii) phy-
sical space; (iv) hardware; (v) software; (vi) maintenan-
ce; (vii) computer usage; (viii) outside labor; and (ix) 
support. The distribution of costs incurred in atten-
ding the outsourced activities is shown in Table 1.
Services 
Rendered by 
SP
Capturing 
Manual and 
Eletronic
Merchant
to play
to receive
Card 
Holder
Emitting 
Bank 
(International 
and National)
Deposit 
Bank
Data 
Captures
Processing
Exchange
Source: Elaborated for the authors.
Figure 1 – Operational fl ow of the credit card business
Table 1 – Distribution of costs by category
Costs Distribution
Support 43%
Computer Usage 27%
Outside Labor 14%
Other Costs 16%
Total 100%
Source: Elaborated for the authors.
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Table 1 shows that the principal elements of 
costs are support (43%), computer usage (27%), 
and outside labor (14%), representing 84% of the 
total costs. These costs are incurred at the level of 
administrative units. The administrative units are 
cost centers—which can be either operational or 
sup port. The operational cost centers (OCCs) exe-
cute production and costumer-service activities 
linked directly to the accomplishment of the tran-
sactions (manual or electronic). The support cost 
centers (SCCs) execute support activities to the 
OCCs—such as system development, planning, 
training, and other back-offi ce activities. Taken to-
gether, the OCCs generate 66% of the total costs, 
whereas the SCCs generate 34%.
The cost centers are basically structured as fi -
xed costs, with the most signifi cant of these being 
support, computer usage, and outside labor, as pre-
sented in table 1. The wages costs are essentially 
the same in OCCs and SCCs, computer costs are 
more signifi cant in OCCs than in SCCs, but outside 
labor costs are greater in SCCs than in OCCs.
Some elements of fi xed costs (such as wages) 
are valid for short periods of activity whereas other 
elements of fi xed costs (such as costs of hardware 
and software) are valid for larger periods of activity. 
Typically, fi xed costs refer to the use of resources 
that possess a limited capacity for production. Wi-
thin a determined interval (range) of activity of any 
given cost center, the fi xed costs remain constant 
(provided that production capacity is not surpas-
sed). However, if the installed capacity were to be 
increased, a larger quantity of fi xed resources would 
be required. As long as the new installed capacity 
is not surpassed, the amount of fi xed costs will re-
main constant. OCCs, for example, have a planned 
structure of resources (equipment, software use li-
censes, people, physical space, and so on) to pro-
cess a predetermined volume of transactions (with 
the time of computer use constituting the unit used 
to measure the work). Above this limit, investments 
in new resources become necessary, thus elevating 
the production capacity to a new higher level and 
expanding the range of activities.
In planning the necessary resources for a given 
cost center, the number of transactions and the use of 
computer time might be important, whereas, for ano-
ther cost center, the number of employees or the size 
of the area to be attended might be more relevant.
The data of case study showed that relevant 
percentage of the total costs has been comprised 
by fi xed costs—that is, there is no direct proportio-
nal relationship between these costs and the volume 
of processed transactions. Figure 2 shows monthly 
transaction volume compared with the annual total 
costs and unitary costs.
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Figure 2 – Transaction volume, total costs, and unit costs
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6.3 Identifying the Method Adopted 
by Companies for Gain-Sharing 
Measurement
The interviews with the managers of the com-
panies showed the fundamental premise of the me-
thod adopted by researched companies relies on 
parameters (cost projection) materialized in fl exible 
budgets and standards for each operational cost 
center established by the “joint team”. The method 
is comprised of four steps.
1. Elaboration of the original budgets—taking 
into account the amounts and the values 
of the resources forecast for each volume 
level and for each cost center (considering 
its particular work units).
2. Revision of the original budgets (or elabo-
ration of the revised budgets)—consisting 
of a revision of the quantities and values 
of the resources previously planned for 
each volume level and for each cost center 
(considering its particular work units). The 
revised budgets constitute the base for 
comparison of expenses incurred and, the-
refore, the measurement of gain-sharing;
3. Counting of the expenses incurred—based 
on the same concepts and criteria adopted 
in the previous phases.
4. Comparison of the expenses incurred with 
the constants in the revised budgets—allo-
wing a measurement of gain-sharing and 
an evaluation of the contribution of the 
cost centers (and the diverse elements 
that make up their costs). The comparison 
between actual costs and estimated costs 
allows the measurement of cost savings to 
be obtained.
As previously noted, the amount of fi xed cost 
stays constant within a determined interval of acti-
vity. The measuring of the savings of fi xed costs is 
through a comparison of the forecast total value of 
expenses (for a given level of activity) with the actual 
total value of the expenses incurred. The following 
situations can occur:
I. The actual activity volume is not the same 
as the planned volume, but occurs within 
the relevant interval
In this case, the economy of fi xed cost is com-
puted by comparing the total value of planned costs 
(for the level of activity executed) with the total value 
of actual costs. Cost effi ciency exists at any point 
within the relevant interval when the actual costs are 
smaller than the costs planned for the interval.
II. The actual activity volume was not the 
same as the planned volume and it was 
outside (above or below) the relevant in-
terval.
In this case, the relevant interval in which the 
activity volume occurs should be determined, and 
this should fi t with the corresponding budget of valid 
cost for the interval of relevance. In the same way, 
the cost effi ciency is measured by the difference be-
tween the costs incurred and the costs estimated 
for that interval of relevance.
Procedures
Table 2 shows the steps and procedures requi-
red for implementing the method.
Table 2 – Procedures of the method
Steps Procedures
1. Elaboration of the original budget • defi ne work units of the cost centers;
 (for cost center for different levels of volumes) • plan the volume intervals of the work units;
  • defi ne the structure of the resource accounts;
  • consider the physical amounts of resources;
  • consider the unitary values of the resources;
  • determine the total values (quantities × prices);
  • consider the total values of the resources for which there are no estimates
   of physical amounts of resources.
2. Revision of the original budget (for cost • confi rm the work units of the cost centers;
 center for different levels of volumes) • reschedule the volume intervals of the work units;
  • confi rm the structure of the resource accounts;
Continua
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Table 3 – Example of the method
Resources
 Original budget Revised budget Actual Variations
 Range 1 Range 2 Range 1 Range 2
 (minutes) (minutes) (minutes) (minutes) 600,000
 (300,000 to (500,001 to 300,000 to 500,001 to minutes
 500,000) 700,000 500,000 700,000
Support  171,122 207,312 188,234 228,043 216,056 11,987
Outside labor 16,758 46,726 18,552 51,640 55,842 (4,202)
Computer usage 806,458 1,443,473 890,105 1,590,820 1,548,994 41,826
Maintenance 9,242 44,472 8,345 38,552 35,647 2,905
hardware
software
Physical 8,969 16,865 9,866 18,552 19,214 (662)
space and
others
Administrative 6,188 9,934 6,384 10,627 10,429 198
Total cost 1,018,737 1,768,782 1,121,486 1,938,234 1,886,182 52,052
Source: Elaborated for the authors.
Conclusão
Steps Procedures
2. Revision of the original budget (for cost • revise the physical amounts of resources of the original budget;
 center for different levels of volumes) • revise the unitary values of resources of the original budget;
  • determine the total costs (quantities × prices);
  • revise the total costs of the resources for which there are no estimates of
   physical amounts of resources.
3. Counting of the amounts realized by • measure the actual volume of work units occurred;
 cost center (for cost center for the level • measure the actual total costs.
 of volume reached)
4. Determination of the effi ciencies of costs • count, for cost center, the variations between the actual costs and the
 (for cost center for the level of volume reached)  revised projected values, established for the volume of work units occurred;
  • determine the occurrence of gain-sharing through the consolidation of
   values of the total cost variations of all cost centers, considering
   that gain-sharing exists only when the total amount of actual costs is inferior
   to the total amount of revised projected costs.
Source: Elaborated for the authors.
Example of the method
In the case study under consideration, the cost 
center named Production is an operational area res-
ponsible for the capturing, processing, and trans-
mission of the data concerning the realized transac-
tions of SP. Table 3 shows the planned performance 
(original and revised) and the realized performance 
of this cost-center in a month, with simulated data.
In Table 3, it is observed that the total costs 
originally planned for the period were $1,018,737, 
for a level (range) of activity of 300,000–500,000 mi-
nutes of computer processing, and $1,788,782 for 
500,001–700,000 minutes. The revised values were, 
respectively, $1,121,486 and $1,938,234 (staying 
in same activity intervals). The performance rea-
lized in the month (corresponding to 600,000 mi-
nutes of computer processing) was a total cost of 
$1,886,182.
Comparing the realized costs with the planned 
costs for the volume of 600,000 minutes, it is obser-
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ved that there was a total gain of $52,052—which 
corresponds to the total of the cost variations in the 
period. Among the favorable variations, the most sig-
nifi cant fl owed from the use of computers ($41,826) 
and support ($11,987). In contrast, variations related 
to external services ($4,202) and to physical space 
($662) were negative—demonstrating that the costs 
were larger than forecast.
7 DISCUSSION
As previously noted, several studies approach 
different aspects of outsourcing relationships. Ho-
wever, no study has specifi cally addressed gain-
sharing measurement—apart from the work of Au-
guste et al. (2000), which touched on the subject.
The concept of gain-sharing adopted by the 
researched companies was not formally declared 
and it was inferred through the analysis of the pro-
cedures as the sharing of a benefi t obtained by de-
veloping an activity in a more economical manner in 
relation to an established parameter. According this 
defi nition gain-sharing can be viewed as an element 
that seeks to express the economical benefi ts in 
business relationship between the companies. The 
defi nition is supported on the following premises:
• be measured against a previously estab-
lished parameters;
• refl ect the effort involved in various actions 
that are undertaken;
• induce performance improvement;
• be objectively measurable;
• be expressed in monetary terms; and
• be mutually acceptable to the parties.
The fi rst premise is the most important be-
cause it drives the procedures for measurement of 
gain-sharing. According to the adopted defi nition 
of gain-sharing by companies, gain-sharing value 
is related to cost savings and to cost-accounting 
concepts of price and effi ciency cost variations. 
According to Horngren et al. (2000), price varia-
tion refl ects the difference between actual and bud-
geted input prices, whereas effi ciency variation re-
fl ects the difference between actual and budgeted 
input quantities.
In this case study, the total benefi ts obtained 
from the business relationship between the compa-
nies are produced by:
• an increase in activity volume (that is, grea-
ter production); or
• a reduction in costs (that is, less resource 
consumption).
The gain produced by increasing activity volu-
me generated an additional contribution margin to 
SR, proportional to the volume of business. The in-
crement in the activity volume is promoted by SR, 
whereas SP supports the growth and made it pos-
sible by allocating resources (human, physical, and 
technological) and adjusting the capacities of the 
various activity centers. SP is responsible for being 
pro-active in implementing technological and opera-
tional solutions to meet the levels of activity reached 
by SR. Therefore, although SP did not increase ac-
tivity volume, it does produce an intangible bene-
fi t by assisting in the processing of a larger volume 
of activity. This required more responsibility, larger 
operational risk, and less fl exibility.
This kind of benefi t is not correctly considered 
gain-sharing (because SP have no action on produ-
cing it), but it should be included (and remunerated) 
in the pricing agreement between the companies—in 
accordance with the premise that the return should 
have relationship with the investment made and the 
risks assumed. It would be unjust to maintain a fi xed 
level of remuneration to SP for assisting in volumes 
of services signifi cantly higher than those originally 
assumed. Although it clearly generates a benefi t for 
SR, this matter should be treated in the pricing po-
licy of the services, rather than through the concept 
of gain-sharing.
Hartman et al. (2001, p. 234) put the view of 
effi ciency in their study as the input conservation, 
that is: “a branch is considered effi cient, relative to 
its peers, if it is able to generate the same amount 
of revenue using less resource”. In this case study, 
the gain that SP affords to SR through cost savings 
(when less resources are consumed than previous-
ly assumed) is correctly considered as gain-sharing 
because:
• the cost savings are entirely transferred to 
SR;
• the gain arises from the efforts of actions 
undertaken by SP;
• the gain refl ects increased performance in 
relation to pre-established parameters;
• the gain is objectively measurable;
• the gain is measurable in monetary terms; 
and
• the gain is based on previously defi ned 
agreements.
In view of the above discussion it can be infer-
red that the method applied by companies to mea-
sure gain-sharing relies on solid assumptions. The 
only issue that should be considered in this case is 
the additional remuneration for SP attending increa-
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sing level of service generated by SR activities with 
the same fi xed remuneration.
The main restrictions of the method adopted 
by companies are due to expensive kind of contract 
to be monitored (being necessary to carry out a joint 
team to manage the outsourced activities) and be-
cause the parties have to defi ne, revise and accept 
precise cost projections for every situation.
8 CONCLUSION
The outsourcing of IT activities is characterized 
by the establishment of a relationship in which both 
parties (buyer and provider) obtain competitive ad-
vantages by maintaining a focus on their respecti-
ve businesses. In such a relationship, the important 
question of measurement of gain-sharing arises, 
but this issue is not well addressed by the literatu-
re. The research carried out with a methodology of 
case study, showed an empirical use of gain-sharing 
concept. The main fi ndings of the research were:
(i) Gain-sharing in this case study refers to the 
sharing of a benefi t provided by SP developing an ac-
tivity in a more economical way in relation to an agre-
ed parameter. It was observed that the concept of 
gain-sharing used by companies in this study corres-
ponds to costs savings measured by cost-accoun-
ting concepts of price and effi ciency cost variances.
(ii) The analysis of the method adopted by the 
companies, which is based on budget parameters, 
allows the measurement of gain-sharing and con-
tributes to transparency in the relationship between 
the companies.
(iii) The method allows an analysis of the earn-
ings in detail (by area, by activity, and by resource ele-
ment), thus identifying opportunities for improvement 
and providing measurable benefi ts for both parties. 
By the other hand the study evidenced what Auguste 
et al. (2000, p. 59) refers as high “interactions costs” 
in gain-sharing contracts due to the necessity of pre-
paring and revising the budgets and to work with a 
joint team of managers of both companies.
Despite the fact that the fi ndings of this case 
study research cannot be fully generalized, they can 
be useful for expanding concepts and driving solu-
tions of gain-sharing measurement in similar situa-
tions of outsourcing relationship in an information 
technology environment.
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